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ABSTRACT 
This paper unpacks two underspecified facets of collaboration: cooperation and 
coordination. Prior research has emphasized cooperation, and specifically the partners‘ 
commitment and alignment of interests, as the key determinant of collaborative success. 
Scholars have paid less attention to the critical role of coordination—the effective 
alignment and adjustment of the partners‘ actions. To redress this imbalance, we 
conceptually disentangle cooperation and coordination in the context of inter-
organizational collaboration, and examine how the two phenomena play out in the partner 
selection, design, and post-formation stages of an alliance‘s life cycle. As we 
demonstrate, a coordination perspective helps resolve some empirical puzzles, but it also 
represents a challenge to received wisdom grounded in the salience of cooperation. To 
stimulate future research, we discuss alternative conceptualizations of the relationship 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Inter-organizational collaboration can be extraordinarily complex and risky. Some 
studies report extremely high failure rates for collaborative endeavors, such as strategic 
alliances and joint ventures,
1 often well in excess of 50 percent (Kale, Dyer, & Singh, 
2002; Kale & Singh, 2009; Lunnan & Haugland, 2008). These discouraging statistics, 
and colorful folklore about high-profile alliance failures, feed a prevailing discourse that 
highlights the hazards of collaboration (Bamford, Gomes-Casseres, & Robinson, 2004; 
Dyer, Kale, & Singh, 2001). 
What accounts for the high failure rate of inter-organizational collaborations? The 
overwhelming majority of sociological and economic studies assert that the partners‘ 
failure to cooperate leads to the ultimate demise of such ties, stemming from the 
misaligned incentives of self-interested agents. At best, conflicting interests can cause 
diminished commitment that gradually withers the relationship (Doz, 1996); at worst, 
they can lead to opportunism, or the pursuit of self-interest with no regard for 
unenforceable commitments or moral obligations (Williamson, 1985). Multiple 
perspectives, including transaction-cost economics (Kogut, 1988; Oxley, 1997; Sampson, 
2004), game theory (Arend & Seale, 2005; Parkhe, 1993), the social-structural 
perspective (Gulati, 1995a; Gulati, 1995b; Robinson & Stuart, 2007), and trust-based 
perspectives (Ring & Van de Ven, 1994; Uzzi, 1997; Zaheer, McEvily, & Perrone, 1998), 
have been employed to explain when, why, and to what effect cooperation problems 
emerge in alliances. The normative implications of such research consist primarily of 
                                                        
1 Because the majority of inter-organizational collaborations over the past decades 
have taken the form of a range of alliances that include joint ventures (Gulati, 1995a), we 
will refer to the two concepts interchangeably.   4 
anticipating and preventing lying, stealing, and cheating among partners, and of 
sustaining partners' commitment, containing hostilities, and minimizing shirking 
behavior. Thus political skills, legal expertise, diplomacy, and psychological acumen 
seem to be required if alliance managers are to ensure the success of their partnerships.  
But there is an alternative view of inter-organizational collaboration, one that 
considers coordination among partners as integral to collaborative efforts (Gulati, 2007a, 
2010; Gulati, Lawrence, & Puranam, 2005; Gulati & Singh, 1998). This ―coordination 
perspective‖ focuses less on preventing opportunistic behavior and sustaining 
commitment than on the mechanics of bringing together partners‘ contributions.
2 The 
implicit assumption here is that, even in a situation of perfect alignment of interests, 
partners still need to divide labor and to coordinate effectively to complete their joint and 
individual tasks.  As a result, the focus shifts to creating structures, institutions, and 
relationships that enable partners to work together across boundaries.  The coordination 
perspective emphasizes organization design, communication, and process management as 
requisite skills of alliance managers.  
Some pockets of research on inter-organizational collaboration—such as those 
that study the antecedents and consequences of contracting and post-formation 
dynamics—have begun acknowledging the importance of both cooperation and 
coordination, but progress is uneven at best; some important streams of research on 
                                                        
2 The distinction between “cooperation” and “coordination” has been 
previously used to delineate the underlying facets of collaboration within 
organizations (e.g. Gulati, 2007b; Gulati, 2010), and across organizational 
boundaries (e.g. Rogers & Whetten 1982). Here we apply and extend these notions 
to develop an analytic framework for the dynamics of inter-organizational 
collaboration.    5 
alliances remain single-mindedly focused on the cooperation perspective. We aim to 
redress this imbalance by presenting a balanced view of cooperation and coordination as 
two indispensable facets of inter-organizational collaboration. We begin by outlining the 
cooperation and coordination perspectives, unpacking the concepts and highlighting some 
of their confounding elements. Second, we specify the roles of cooperation and 
coordination during three distinct phases of alliances: partner selection, alliance design, 
and post-formation dynamics (Gulati, 1998); within each phase, we review prior research 
grounded in either perspective. We also discuss how a combined perspective could 
provide a more comprehensive and nuanced account of partnerships, resolve some 
puzzles intractable from the cooperation perspective alone, and open up new avenues for 
research. Finally, we examine the theoretical foundations and normative implications of 
the different ways in which cooperation and coordination relate to each other, as well as 
to the performance of the collaboration. We conclude with a discussion of research 
questions that draw on both sets of issues.   6 
II. CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATIONS 
The Cooperation Perspective 
We define inter-organizational cooperation as joint pursuit of agreed-on goal(s) in 
a manner corresponding to a shared understanding about contributions and payoffs.
3 
Cooperation, in this view, is a behavioral outcome of variable quality—inter-
organizational relations can range from highly cooperative to highly uncooperative—that 
relies on partners‘ agreement about the provision and appropriation of resources for the 
collaborative effort (see Table 1). Organizations negotiate what they are willing to 
contribute (time, resources, market access, etc.) to get what they want (new IP, more 
efficiency, enhanced legitimacy, etc.) from the alliance. The agreement that they forge on 
these inputs and outputs describes the intended "extent of cooperation," or the intended 
scope of the relationship. That scope can range from narrowly defined and clearly 
budgeted short-term initiatives (such as a co-promotion arrangement) to broad and open-
ended long-term engagement (such as technology/IP sharing partnerships). Whether 
narrow or broad in scope, organizations typically engage in cooperation to share 
investment risk or to pursue a variety of operational, commercial, technological, or 
                                                        
3 Unless otherwise specified, we assume organizational actors rather than specific 
individuals involved to be the decision makers in an alliance. A minimum level of 
cooperation among organizational actors (e.g., exchange of information, arranging 
logistics) has long been recognized as fundamental to any market transaction, even an 
arm‘s-length one (Smith, [1776] 1979; Tuomela, 2000). Our focus here, like that of most 
contemporary management research on inter-organizational cooperation, is narrower: we 
are examining enduring close ties, especially alliances of various forms including joint 
ventures, which involve deeper levels of mutual engagement, and usually more 
interdependence and more joint decision making, than do pure-form transactional 
relationships (Powell, 1990).   7 
reputational benefits that may be difficult or impossible to attain via transactional 
relationships (Oliver, 1990). 
==================== insert table 1 about here ================== 
Agreements on inputs and outputs create a particular configuration of resource 
interdependence (Pfeffer & Nowak, 1976; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) between partners, 
since each partner's expected benefits from the relationship depend on others‘ 
contributions. The larger the intended extent of cooperation—that is, the more inputs are 
provided or outputs are expected—the higher the interdependence among partners and 
the greater the need for a high level of cooperation among them, all else being equal 
(Gulati & Sytch, 2007).  
Given resource interdependence, the key cooperation concern is that the partners 
won't behave as agreed with regard to contributions or payoffs. Such deviations constitute 
cooperation failures: organizations may shirk—contribute less than agreed—or try to 
claim more benefits than agreed via misappropriation of partner resources or alliance 
outcomes or via holdup, the exploitation of a superior bargaining position to negotiate 
more favorable terms.
 4 Cooperation failures lead partners to negatively evaluate the 
                                                        
4 Alliance research often assumes that partners have a shared understanding of the 
cooperation agreement, and shared expectations about contributions and claims to 
outcomes that flow from it. But even detailed formal agreements cannot fully and 
unequivocally specify expectations (Klein, 1996). Thus partners can have idiosyncratic 
and shifting understandings of expectations in the partnership, and can subjectively 
evaluate others‘ behavior against their understandings of expectations (Ring & Van de 
Ven, 1994). Misalignments of partners‘ subjective perceptions of expectations and 
behavior can be reconciled during the course of an alliance if there is adequate 
communication between the partners. Economic game theorists, for example, have 
examined in detail when and how partners manage to align expectations to achieve 
cooperative equilibria in what they call ―coordination games‖ (Camerer, 2003; Knez &   8 
cooperativeness of particular participating organizations or the entire joint effort, as they 
question the sincerity of promises regarding contributions and commitment, and the 
reliability of agreements about the distributions of payoffs (Gulati, Khanna, & Nohria, 
1994). As a result, partners may reduce their investments in the partnership, contributing 
to its deterioration and ultimately its dissolution. These unanticipated shifts in partners‘ 
support of the joint effort, and specifically changes in the level of their contributions and 
claims to outcomes, have been designated relational risk (Das & Teng, 2001; Das & 
Teng, 1996; Noteboom, 1999). 
Causes and remedies of cooperation failures. Cooperation failures are rooted in 
partners‘ diverging/misaligned interests. Alliance partners essentially remain independent 
economic actors, retain control over their own resource-allocation decisions, have 
different and possibly conflicting strategic objectives (Deeds & Hill, 1999; Hamel, 1991; 
Park & Ungson, 2001), and may be subject to different sets of environmental influences 
(Koka, Madhavan, & Prescott, 2006; Koza & Lewin, 1998; Madhavan, Koka, & Prescott, 
1998). Internal choices or external pressures may lead partners to exhibit different levels 
of interest in the joint effort, or direct conflict of interest and rivalry in the relationship.   
The problems created by misaligned incentives can be exacerbated by 
opportunism—economic actors‘ tendency to pursue their self-interest with guile, 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Camerer, 1994). Similarly, in the case of alliances, if there is an alignment of 
expectations, cooperation failure can be avoided. If there is persistent misalignment of 
expectations among partners, they can lead to conflict, reduced commitment, and 
partnership dissolution. Unfortunately, the study of the dynamics of partner expectations 
and behavior during the course of a partnership has not been the subject of extensive 
prior research.   9 
irrespective of ―gentlemanly agreements‖ or moral obligations (Williamson, 1985).
5 
There is disagreement between different research traditions on the universality and the 
detectability of opportunism. Transaction-cost economists typically believe that all 
transaction partners should be regarded with caution, either because psychological 
opportunism is universal or because it is an unobservable characteristic of potential 
partners (Ghoshal & Moran, 1996; Williamson, 1985). Sociologists and social 
psychologists are often more optimistic: they suggest that opportunism varies among 
economic actors and across situations, determined for example by actor‘s inherent 
integrity or positive affect toward partners (Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 1995; 
Schoorman, Mayer, & Davis, 2007), and that it can be predicted by reputational 
indicators such as prior direct partnering experiences (Gulati, 1995b; Li & Rowley, 
2002).  
Economics, sociology, and social psychology also suggest different remedies for 
cooperation failures. The economic perspective (especially transaction-cost economics) 
has emphasized the need for potential partners to assess the characteristics of a planned 
alliance, of alternative partners, and of the alliance‘s environment in order to evaluate the 
likely level of opportunism and to develop effective responses to limit or prevent it, e.g., 
through partner selection, formal structures, and contractual arrangements as well as 
ongoing monitoring and control (Luo, 2006; Williamson, 1991). Partners may establish 
                                                        
5 While some alliance cooperation failures are indeed caused by opportunistic 
behavior—by ―lying, cheating and stealing‖ partners—many can be traced to less 
extreme forms of behavior, such as partners‘ gradual loss of interest in the alliance due to 
diminished expectations of future benefits from it, or due to a strategic reorientation. A 
broader conception of cooperation therefore takes into account the level of commitment 
to the relationship rather than merely the presence or absence of opportunism (Ring & 
Van de Ven, 1994).   10 
formal controls and sanctions based on legally enforceable contractual agreements to 
limit opportunism.  A complementary approach is to rely on private sanctions that do not 
depend on third-party enforcement (unlike, for example, financial penalties), such as a 
―shadow of the future,‖ the invocation of future interactions and their benefits (Heide & 
Miner, 1992; Poppo, Zhou, & Ryu, 2008); or an ―exchange of hostages,‖ a mutual 
commitment to the partnership in the form of investments in relationship-specific assets 
(Ahmadjian & Oxley, 2006; Williamson, 1983). Fundamentally, economic perspectives 
on cooperation emphasize individual partners‘ need for vigilance and ingenuity to detect 
and effectively respond to threats of opportunistic behavior.
6 
The social-structural perspective suggests alternative remedies to inter-
organizational cooperation failures informed by sociology.  It is based on the notion that 
economic activity is ―shaped, redirected [and] constrained by social context; norms, 
interpersonal trust, social networks and social organizations are important in the 
functioning . . . of the economy‖ (Coleman, 1988: S96). The social-structural perspective 
thus broadens the focus from formal governance and private sanctions in preventing 
opportunism to the deterrent power of social pressures and reputational mechanisms. For 
instance, pre-existing direct and indirect social ties can provide information on potential 
partners‘ trustworthiness, and the threat of reputational damage provides disincentives to 
uncooperative behavior such as shirking, holdup, or misappropriation (Gulati & Gargiulo, 
                                                        
6 An alternative approach to the threat of opportunism is suggested by the real-
options perspective on alliance management (Folta & Miller, 2002; Reuer & Tong, 2005; 
Seth & Chi, 2006). Here the emphasis is less on anticipating specific opportunistic 
behaviors ex ante. Instead, partners design agreements that allow them to resolve risks 
dynamically by modifying their partnering decisions (e.g., via the exercise of acquisition 
or termination options). What this perspective shares with the other economic 
perspectives is a reliance on individual partners‘ strategic acumen to ensure positive 
outcomes from cooperation.    11 
1999). Similarly, organizations may seek out high-status partners not only because their 
position can serve as a signal of reliability (Cable & Shane, 1997; Podolny, 1994) but 
also because reputational damage would be particularly punitive for these actors 
(Robinson & Stuart, 2007). In sum, social structure plays an active role in both the ex-
ante selection of partners and the ex-post deterrence of opportunistic behavior. Such 
reputation-based deterrence relies on institutions and norms about reciprocity, 
equity/fairness, truthfulness, solidarity, and the like in partners‘ environments (Coleman, 
1988; Guler, 2007; Phillips, Turco, & Zuckerman, 2011). The socially imposed costs of 
uncooperative behavior need to be sufficiently and reliably high for partners to base their 
trust on structural cues. 
Finally, the trust-based perspective emphasizes social-psychological mechanisms 
such as positive affect arising from mutual identification or relational attachment between 
boundary spanners of the partner organizations in avoiding cooperation failures and in 
promoting stability and equity in alliances (Gulati & Sytch, 2008; Ingram & Yue, 2008; 
Zaheer et al., 1998). In contrast to the economic and s perspectives, which both 
emphasize legal, private, or social sanctions, the psychological tradition maintains that 
partners may not behave opportunistically even if they have an incentive and the ability 
to do so (Schoorman, Mayer, & Davis, 1996; Schoorman et al., 2007) because 
opportunism would violate internalized values and principles of behavior and damage 
their self-image (Barney & Hansen, 1994).  
Ironically, even as critics of the economic perspective have focused on the roles 
of social structures and dyadic trust, they have implicitly agreed that ensuring 
cooperation is the primary problem in alliances. But sustained commitment, relationship-  12 
specific investments, trust, and contractual safeguards against opportunism do not in 
themselves guarantee an alliance‘s success. Despite best intentions, partners may find it 
difficult to efficiently combine the resources they bring to the table, to synchronize their 
actions, or to realize the planned payoffs.  
The Coordination Perspective 
Coordination is broadly understood in the social sciences as the linking, meshing, 
synchronization, or alignment of actions (Aiken et al., 1975; Okhuysen & Bechky, 2009). 
In an inter-organizational context, we define coordination as the deliberate and orderly 
alignment or adjustment of partners’ actions to achieve jointly determined goals. We 
regard coordination as an outcome that can be characterized by efficiency, the relative 
cost of designing and operating coordination mechanisms, and by effectiveness, the 
degree to which coordination efforts actually produce the desired alignment or 
adjustment of action. Coordination typically involves the specification and operation of 
information-sharing, decision-making, and feedback mechanisms in the relationship to 
unify and bring order to partners‘ efforts, and to combine partners‘ resources in 
productive ways. In short: coordination seeks to ensure that partners‘ efforts ―click‖ and 
yield the desired outcomes with minimal process losses. The nature of the order around 
which such efforts are organized, i.e., the specific internal requirements and external 
pressures that determine the task structure of the partnership, is up to the participants to   13 
negotiate.
7 Similarly, partners negotiate how much aligning and how much adjusting each 
party undertakes (Killing, 1983; Okhuysen & Bechky, 2009; Rogers & Whetten, 1982). 
A conceptual focus on coordination issues rather than cooperation issues provides 
a different perspective on alliances: while the cooperation perspective centers attention 
on partners‘ level of agreement about goals, the contribution of resources, and the sharing 
of benefits, the coordination perspective highlights the specific ways that partners devise 
to implement and operate the relationship—the nuts and bolts of organization and 
administration. Importantly, coordination challenges are not automatically resolved 
merely because partners‘ interests align (Heath & Staudenmayer, 2000; Kretschmer & 
Puranam, 2008). On the contrary, coordination problems require ―intelligent, vigorous, 
persistent and organized effort‖ (Gulick & Urwick, 1937: 6). As numerous studies of 
public agencies and social-service delivery systems have demonstrated (e.g., Litwak & 
Hylton, 1962; Rogers & Whetten, 1982), even partners with the best intentions and well-
aligned incentives can turn out to be incompetent administrators of inter-organizational 
relationships and fail to find workable answers to questions about who will do what by 
when and how. By failing to plan, or failing to adjust to each other‘s practices and 
structures, and by adopting rigid roles, procedures, and interfaces that prevent ad-hoc 
responses to emerging problems, partners may jeopardize the attainment of alliance 
goals. All alliances face coordination challenges, since by definition they involve some 
division of labor and thus some task interdependence among partners. Hence, all alliances 
                                                        
7 This emphasis on negotiation of coordination arrangements is in keeping with 
recent scholarship that views coordination requirements as equivocal and ambiguous, and 
assumes many interdependencies to be less than fully technologically determined and 
thus subject to some social deliberation (de Rond & Bouchikhi, 2004; Gulati, 
Raveendran, & Silvestri, 2012; Raveendran, Puranam, & Warglien, 2012) and some 
strategic choice (Dyer, 1996, 1997).   14 
require some coordination provisions that enable partners to exchange information and 
engage in joint planning, and that ensure compatible timing and sequencing of actions 
(Palmer, 1983), productive combination of resources and capabilities (Das & Teng, 
2000), and quick responses to market changes and trends (Uzzi, 1997). 
Organizations engage in coordination efforts to manage the task interdependence 
that can flow from a given division of labor or from the production technologies in use 
(Raveendran & Puranam, 2012; Thompson, 1967), and to manage uncertainties arising 
from internal tasks or the external environment (Bensaou & Venkatraman, 1995; Clark & 
Fujimoto, 1991; Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967; Van de Ven, Delbecq, & Koenig, 1976).
8 
Hence, the extent of the coordination attempted by alliance partners—the range of 
activities, processes, and roles encompassed in their efforts to align and adjust—can vary 
widely. As a general rule, coordination scholarship has suggested that higher degrees of 
interdependence, and higher levels of task and environmental uncertainty, require more 
extensive forms of coordination (see e.g. Argote, 1982; Galbraith, 1977; Thompson, 
1967).  
Given task interdependencies, and task and environmental uncertainties in an 
alliance, partners‘ key coordination-related concerns are, first, whether they can 
collectively recognize and manage them and, second, whether they can do so efficiently. 
Greater interdependence and uncertainty in an alliance may increase coordination costs 
                                                        
8 Incidentally, Barnard‘s research on the role of organizations in managing the 
division of labor and ensuing coordination (1938)  was published shortly after Coase 
conceptualized organizations as a means to mitigate the transaction costs of exchange 
(1937). That is, the foundational texts on organizations‘ coordination and cooperation 
issues respectively were written around the same time.   15 
and may also increase the likelihood of coordination failures,
 9 which can be traced either 
to the flawed design or to flawed implementation of coordination mechanisms.
 10 
Coordination failures can take the form of omissions of crucial activities, spatial or 
temporal misallocation of resources, and incompatibility of activities intended to be 
complementary. For example, task uncertainties, which constrain partners‘ ability to 
predict the outcome of work processes, increase the likelihood of incompatibilities and 
make precise synchronization of activities more difficult (Varshney & Oppenheim, 
2011). Coordination failures can have significant adverse consequences for the alliance as 
a whole: they can cause inefficiencies and delays, and may prevent partners from 
attaining specific alliance goals (Mohr & Spekman, 1994). Ultimately, coordination 
failures can lead alliance partners to doubt the feasibility of the joint enterprise and to 
abandon the effort. To mirror the concept of relational risk, which encompasses 
unforeseen changes in partners‘ commitments and claims in the relationship that 
                                                        
9 Economists use the term coordination failure to denote situations in which 
economic actors could have achieved better cooperative equilibria had they coordinated 
their actions (see, e.g. Cooper, 1998).  But research on economic coordination failure 
often focuses on problems that prevent actors from providing resources to a mutually 
beneficial joint effort (in our terminology, cooperation problems), rather than problems 
that affect the combination or integration of resources in a joint effort. The organization-
theory conception of coordination failure, on which we base our arguments, concentrates 
on these combination and integration problems.  
10 Flawed design encompasses factors like erroneous task decomposition, 
misconceived task allocation (such as assigning tasks to agents ill equipped to handle 
them), and misspecification of coordination mechanisms such as communication 
interfaces (Puranam, Raveendran, & Knudsen, 2012; Raveendran & Puranam, 2012). 
Failures of implementation can include actors‘ mistakes while performing assigned tasks 
and failure to use specified coordination mechanisms properly.   16 
jeopardize cooperation, we designate the risk of unforeseen coordination costs and of 
coordination failures as an alliance‘s operational risk.
11  
Causes of and remedies for coordination failures. Coordination failure stems 
from the cognitive limitations of those who design and implement coordination 
mechanisms, from underlying cultural differences, and from the rigidities and immobility 
of existing structures, processes, and resources. Cognitive limitations, specifically 
bounded rationality (Simon & March, 1993), constrain individuals‘ ability to fully 
recognize, project, and accommodate the impact of different types and levels of 
interdependence among tasks, roles and units. Individuals often fail to recognize 
interdependencies: they tend to apply heuristics that lead them to think too narrowly and 
crudely about task partitioning and specialization among roles and units, and to 
underestimate the interrelationships between tasks and resulting coordination needs 
(Heath & Staudenmayer, 2000; Puranam et al., 2012). And even when individuals do 
recognize interdependencies, attention constraints limit the effectiveness of their 
coordination efforts by restricting their ability to monitor, manage, and respond to a large 
number of activities or events (Ocasio, 1997). Especially in alliances characterized by 
multiple or highly diverse partners, the sheer quantity and variety of coordination issues 
may be too taxing even for highly capable organizers and administrators, and may 
                                                        
11 The task of managing cooperation and coordination, and by extension 
managing relational and operational risk, may be assigned to different sets of people 
within the partnering organizations (Argyres & Mayer, 2007). For example, ensuring 
cooperation often falls on senior managers (who control resource allocation 
decisions) and lawyers who oversee the contracts. The design and operation of 
detailed coordination mechanisms, by contrast, is often the responsibility of lower-
level employees and managers.   17 
impede their ability to distinguish between truly critical issues and those that are merely 
proximate or recent (Park & Ungson, 2001).  
Coordination failures can also be caused by cultural differences between partner 
organizations. Given unique organizational, industry, or national cultures, the 
administrators of the alliance may utilize different and potentially incompatible practices 
(White, 2005). More fundamentally, however, cultural differences also make cognitive 
differences between these boundary spanners more likely (Berends, Garud, Debackere, & 
Weggeman, 2011): they may have different conceptions of required tasks and of the 
alliance‘s environment, and may disagree about which task interdependencies and 
uncertainties are most important, about how much alignment is required or desirable, and 
about when the right level of alignment has been achieved (Alter & Hage, 1993: 78; 
Gerwin, 2004: 246). This scenario suggests that individuals participating in an alliance 
are likely to experience significantly more equivocality, i.e. overlapping and conflicting 
views, about key inter-organizational coordination decisions than about intra-
organizational coordination decisions (Daft & Weick, 1984; de Rond & Bouchikhi, 2004; 
Thomas & Trevino, 1993). These disagreements can exacerbate alliance administrators‘ 
existing cognitive limits, and cause omissions of critical actions and incompatibility of 
efforts intended to be complementary.   
Lastly, partners‘ existing organizational structures, routines, and resources may 
stand in the way of effective inter-organizational coordination. Organizational inertia can 
hinder coordination efforts even if all coordination-relevant information is available and 
understood, and even if agreement exists in principle on how to address coordination 
needs. Partners may, for example, struggle to implement alliance coordination provisions,   18 
or changes to such provisions, due to resistance from organizational members or external 
stakeholders (Doz, 1996; Hannan & Freeman, 1984). Furthermore, resource stickiness 
may constrain how fast partners can acquire and integrate new tangible or intangible 
resources, or repurpose existing resources for new purposes (Mishina, Pollock, & Porac, 
2004; Penrose, 1959; Szulanski, 2003). Thus they will be unable to properly respond to 
plans if they require resources and capabilities that are not readily available.
12 
To suggest ways in which coordination failures can be overcome, the 
comparatively small literature on alliance coordination draws on a variety of 
coordination-related research on intra- and inter-organizational coordination (Alter & 
Hage, 1993; Grandori & Soda, 1995; Smith, Carroll, & Ashford, 1995). For clarity, we 
organize these influences into three schools of thought: structural, institutional, and 
relational. 
The structural perspective, rooted in early administrative scholarship, suggests 
that coordination failures can be avoided by means of appropriate organizational and job 
design.  Early administrative scholarship particularly emphasized the capacity of 
organizational hierarchies—formal, vertical mechanisms of coordination—to facilitate 
the accomplishment of complex and interdependent tasks by establishing clear authority 
relations and formalization of organizational activities (Barnard, 1938; Fayol, 1949; 
Weber, 1974). Joint-venture structures and formal contracts can replicate key elements of 
hierarchy (Stinchcombe, 1985)—such as standard operating procedures and hierarchical 
                                                        
12 The assumption of organizational inertia has especially important implications 
for partner selection: because the partners will have a difficult time adapting their 
organizational structures and resources to the needs of the alliance, it is critical for the 
long-term evolution of the collaboration to select partners with a high level of fit to the 
task at hand and to one‘s own organization‘s resources.   19 
controls—that clarify and formalize the division of labor, overcome individuals‘ bounded 
rationality and limited span of attention (Gulati & Singh, 1998),
 and bridge cultural 
differences (Vlaar, Van den Bosch, & Volberda, 2006). 
Coordination scholars building on early administrative research were quick to 
point out, however, that more formalization and stricter authority structures alone are not 
enough to ensure efficiency or effectiveness of coordination, and that organizational 
designers need to consider critical internal and external contingencies to select suitable 
means of coordination (Burns & Stalker, 1961; Chandler, 1962; Galbraith, 1977; 
Thompson, 1967; Tushman & Nadler, 1978). Such a structural contingency approach 
suggests that partners need to consider the alliance‘s and partners‘ technology, 
information-processing needs, strategy, and exposure to internal or external change when 
selecting appropriate structures.
 Of course, the task of designing congruent alliance 
structures that take into account such a complex set of contingencies may well exceed the 
cognitive limits of alliance managers. 
The institutional school of thought on coordination suggests that coordination 
failure can be avoided not just by means of formal and explicit rules, but also by means 
of informal norms and implicit assumptions derived from broad societal institutions 
(DiMaggio, 1997) or more industry-, profession-, or organization-specific institutions 
(Bechky, 2003; Cooper, Hinings, Greenwood, & Brown, 1996; Cooper, Rose, 
Greenwood, & Hinings, 2000; Tilcsik, 2010). These cultural influences can inform 
individuals‘ perceptions of task interdependencies (Steensma, Marino, Weaver, & 
Dickson, 2000) and their interpretation of the level and impact of external uncertainties 
(Daft & Weick, 1984). Selznick encouraged organizational leaders to actively pursue the   20 
development of institutions to ―provide the individual with an ordered approach to his 
day-to-day problems, a way of responding to the world consistently yet involuntarily, in 
accordance with approved perspectives yet without continuous reference to explicit 
formalized rules‖ (Selznick, 1957: 17). Importantly, shared institutions can enable 
coordination among actors without much direct communication or interaction by 
providing a basis for conventions (e.g., metrics and measuring systems), implicitly 
agreed-on meanings (e.g., for technical or administrative jargon), and values (e.g., the 
importance of reciprocity, information sharing, constructive feedback, etc.) (Chwe, 2001; 
Reich & Mankin, 1986).
13 But developing alliance-specific institutions to bridge partners‘ 
cultural differences can be difficult. Traditional organizations can rely on a unifying 
―normative territory,‖ clear identification, and clear boundaries to support the 
socialization and homogenization of diverse employees and the internal development of a 
shared understanding of the organizational tasks and the organizational environment 
(Kogut & Zander, 1996). Inter-organizational partnerships, in contrast, often have to 
contend with employees‘ dual identification with the parent organization and the 
partnership, divided authority structures, and transient boundaries (Schreiner, Kale, & 
Corsten, 2009). 
The relational school of thought suggests that much inter-organizational 
coordination is accomplished extemporaneously by individuals and groups. It also has 
                                                        
 
13 Economic game theorists also consider the role of implicit understandings and 
conventions in allowing or preventing mutually beneficial equilibria (Sugden, 1995; Van 
Huyck, Battalio, & Rankin, 1997; Young, 1993). A frequently invoked simple example is 
two cars approaching each other from opposite directions on a road. In most countries, 
convention leads both drivers to steer to the right side of the road from their own 
perspective, and thus to pass each other rather than colliding.   21 
long and distinguished intellectual tradition: Gulick (1937) and Chandler (1962) both 
argued that managers are critical to coordination not because of their faithful adherence 
to plans and procedures but because of their skill at ad-hoc interventions to improve 
productivity, eliminate waste, and ensure adequate responses to unforeseen crises. 
Alliance managers functioning as ―active coordinators‖ interact directly with others to 
work out interdependencies and uncertainties (Follett, 1949) and to develop ad-hoc or 
routine responses to them. This emergent process of coordination relies on partners‘ 
careful staffing of the alliance (Phillips, 1960), inter-organizational boundary spanners 
and liaisons (Gittell, 2002; Provan & Milward, 1995), strong interpersonal relationships 
among those boundary spanners and liaisons (Ancona & Caldwell, 1992; Hansen, 1999; 
Kale, Singh, & Perlmutter, 2000), and regular opportunities for them to interact within 
supportive but relatively unstructured communication and decision-making channels 
(Thomas & Trevino, 1993). The effectiveness of this approach is constrained, however, 
by the cognitive limitations of the ―active coordinators‖ and their ability to overcome 
cultural differences.  
Taken together, these three perspectives illustrate the possible scope of alliances‘ 
coordination challenges, and the various means that organizations have at their disposal 
to tackle them. At a basic level, they remind us that even when questions about partners‘ 
motivations and commitment have been resolved, other questions remain about exactly 
how they are to interact to ensure that objectives are accomplished, synergies are 
achieved, and resources are used efficiently. This fundamental insight shifts our 
interpretation of alliances: we view them not merely as deals and strategic agreements but 
also as entities characterized by boards, staffs, task forces, information and decision-  22 
making processes, databases, facilities, and other material resources, all of which entail 
practical real-world organizational challenges.    23 
 
III. COOPERATION AND COORDINATION ACROSS THE LIFE CYCLE OF 
AN ALLIANCE 
The conceptual distinction between the cooperation and coordination perspectives 
can be applied to the study of alliance outcomes over the entire life of an alliance, from 
inception to termination. But the two perspectives have rarely been applied consistently 
across the three stages of the alliance life cycle: (1) partner selection, (2) alliance design, 
and (3) post-formation dynamics (Gulati, 1998). This section builds on prior research to 
highlight the two perspectives‘ differing explanations for partners‘ decisions and 
behavior in the three stages. We will highlight how the two perspectives jointly facilitate 
a richer and more nuanced descriptive and normative understanding of collaborative 
relationships. Finally, we will propose some research directions suggested by a deeper 
grasp of the coordination problems within alliances. 
================== insert table 2 about here ==================== 
Partner Selection 
 Among the questions surrounding the formation of alliances—primarily, why do 
firms enter into alliances, and when do they do so and with whom?—the question of 
partner selection has been particularly actively debated over the past two decades. The 
overarching thrust of the literature has been to focus on the criteria by which firms select 
their alliance partners or on the factors that shape the propensity of firms to partner with 
each other.    24 
 
The cooperation perspective on partner selection. Firms‘ forward-looking 
concerns about future cooperation failure often affect their partner selection criteria. As a 
result, organizations are likely to consider not only prospective partners resource 
endowments to ensure complementary contributions that promise high payoffs ways 
(Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1996; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978), but also try to assess their 
integrity, reputation, and likely commitment to the partnership to reduce the risk of 
opportunistic behavior. In particular, organizations seek information about prospective 
partners‘ past behavior and track records, and assess inducements to cooperation that 
these partners may be subject to.  
These considerations lead to partner selection based on (1) prior direct 
partnerships, (2) proximity, (3) partner status, or (4) similarity. Preference for familiar 
partners—partners with whom the organization has allied before—can be attributed to 
greater knowledge of their motivation and commitment (Gulati, 1995b; Podolny, 1994). 
Repeat partnerships also restrain opportunism by increasing anticipation of future 
productive exchanges (―the shadow of the future,‖ in the words of Axelrod, 1984; Heide 
& Miner, 1992), and strengthen commitment by fostering trust and affective interpersonal 
ties between the boundary spanners (Gulati & Sytch, 2008; Seabright, Levinthal, & 
Fichman, 1992). Organizations have also demonstrated preferences for proximate 
partners—those that share common ties with the focal organization (Chung, Singh, & 
Lee, 2000; Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999; Walker, Kogut, & Shan, 1997) or are situated in the   25 
same industry or region (Sorenson & Stuart, 2008; Trapido, 2007)
 14—and for high-status 
partners (Ahuja, 2000; Guler & Guillen, 2010). Both proximity and status offer 
informational advantages—it may be easier to assess proximate or high-status partners‘ 
reputations—and deter opportunism by threatening damage to uncooperative partners‘ 
reputations. Finally, organizations tend toward homophily, or a preference for partners 
similar to themselves, characterized by positive affect and by the perception of shared 
fate and alignment of interests that such similarity entails (Ingram & Yue, 2008). 
Reduced cooperation concerns may thus explain why shared national origins (Ingram & 
Inman, 1996), shared organizational form (Ingram & McEvily, 2007), and comparable 
organizational status (Chung et al., 2000; Podolny, 1994) are all important criteria for 
partner selection. 
The coordination perspective on partner selection. The cooperation perspective 
can explain many of the empirically observed patterns of partner selection, but its account 
of the criteria that firms consider during the alliance-formation phase is incomplete: at the 
outset of an alliance, firms may anticipate ex-ante coordination challenges just as they do 
cooperation challenges, and thus select the partners with whom they expect inter-
organizational coordination to be most efficient and most likely to succeed.
 A 
coordination perspective on alliance formation—still underdeveloped in the literature—
suggests coordination competence and structural and cultural compatibility as important 
partner-selection criteria.
  
                                                        
14 Preference for partner familiarity and proximity is strongest when the exchange 
hazards in the transaction are greatest (Meuleman, Lockett, Manigart, & Wright, 2010; 
Sorenson & Stuart, 2008), suggesting that a desire to reduce relational risk is an 
important motivation for such behavior.   26 
While little of the prior research on alliances has explicitly discussed anticipated 
coordination concerns as a factor shaping the choice of partners, a close look at the 
selection criteria examined in prior research suggests that some of the criteria used may 
actually be proxies for ex-ante coordination concerns. For instance, organizations that 
anticipate coordination challenges in an alliance may look for partners that seem 
generally competent at inter-organizational coordination. Such an assessment can be 
based on first-hand experience of a partner‘s coordination competence (e.g., Li & 
Rowley, 2002) or on such proxies as extensive alliance experience (Gulati, 1999) or the 
presence of a dedicated alliance-management function within a prospective partner‘s 
organization (Kale et al., 2002; Schreiner et al., 2009). 
It is possible that a potential partner‘s prior experience may be limited to 
particular types of partners and alliance contexts, and thus inadequate to ensure efficient 
and effective coordination. To minimize coordination costs and the likelihood of 
coordination failures, prior research suggests that organizations may seek partners not 
just for their competence but also compatibility with regard to resources, organizational 
processes, language, and culture (Mitsuhashi & Greve, 2009; Nachum, 2010; Stuart, 
1998). Such compatibility in a particular joint effort may be difficult to determine with 
certainty ex ante, but familiarity among partners provides information about each other‘s 
cultural and structural makeup (Li & Rowley, 2002) and equips them to anticipate and 
bridge remaining incompatibilities (Zollo, Reuer, & Singh, 2002). Further, partner 
proximity in the technology, industry, or geographical space can serve as proxies of 
compatibility: it increases the odds of partners having similar technological standards, 
organizational structures, knowledge bases, and a shared language, all of which reduce   27 
equivocality about coordination requirements and the risk of incompatibilities (Stuart, 
1998; White, 2005; White & Lui, 2005). 
Given the importance of compatibility, alliances built on the expected synergistic 
benefits of complementarities—value-creating differences in partners‘ resource 
endowments—can represent a particular coordination challenge. A higher level of 
complementarity implies a more complex division of labor because the tasks of each 
actor become more specialized, increasing interdependence and thus the need for greater 
coordination (Becker & Murphy, 1992). Dissimilarity of resources can also increase 
uncertainty, in that partners are more likely to struggle to understand each other‘s 
contributions, how best to integrate them, and what outcomes can be expected from 
integration. As a result, realizing the potential upside of complementarities requires more 
extensive and higher-quality coordination efforts (Das & Teng, 2000) or greater ex-ante 
compatibility between the partners (Dyer & Singh, 1998).
15 
Discussion. A side-by-side comparison reveals some similarities between the 
cooperation and coordination perspectives. Specifically, some partner-selection criteria 
that are typically viewed as motivated by a desire to reduce relational risk—such as 
familiarity and similarity—may also have coordination-related motivations. For example, 
greater familiarity can build trust and facilitate cooperation (Gulati, 1995a), but it can 
                                                        
15 Little is known about how firms manage complementarity and compatibility 
issues in partner selection, and in particular about whether and when tradeoffs are 
involved. Existing studies suggest a ―Goldilocks principle‖: a preference for partners that 
are not too similar and not too dissimilar, in terms of resources and capabilities, to ensure 
synergistic benefits while avoiding excessive coordination costs (Baum, Cowan, & 
Jonard, 2010; Mitsuhashi & Greve, 2009). However, most studies use proxy variables to 
assess who partners with whom; there have been no field-based efforts to directly study 
the deliberations over complementarity and compatibility that precede the formation of 
alliances.    28 
also facilitate coordination via familiarity with the partner‘s coordination capabilities and 
development of relationship-specific coordination routines (Li & Rowley, 2002; Zollo et 
al., 2002). Future research employing in-depth field interviews or surveys may help 
unpack partner-selection rationales and advance our understanding of whether and how 
organizations balance cooperation and coordination considerations in different contexts 
(see, for example, Gulati, 1995b).   
The coordination perspective also contributes new insights to our understanding 
of partner selection. It suggests that the ability to coordinate is an important partner-
selection criterion, as well as a preference for more experienced and more capable 
partners. This possibility is at odds with evidence from cooperation-focused studies, 
suggesting that a focal organization may prefer counterparties with less alliance 
experience who would be more vulnerable to its own opportunistic behavior (Graebner, 
2009). The coordination perspective also emphasizes a partner‘s internal characteristics 
(e.g., its structural or cultural makeup) rather than only its relationships or position (e.g., 
prior collaborations, status, or proximity) to explain partner-selection decisions. While 
the cooperation perspective considers some internal organizational characteristics that are 
linked to organizational identity and can trigger in-group/out-group identifications and 
positive affect (Ingram & Yue, 2008), the coordination perspective highlights technical 
characteristics such as resource similarity and knowledge overlap (Mitsuhashi & Greve, 
2009; Stuart, 1998). Finally, the two perspectives differ in their view of partners‘ 
resource complementarities: from a cooperation perspective, complementarities are a 
clear benefit to alliances in that they can increase mutual dependence between partners 
and thus incentives for cooperation (Gulati & Sytch, 2007); from a coordination   29 
perspective, complementarities involve a more complex division of labor and more 
extensive coordination, and thus increase coordination costs (Becker & Murphy, 1992). 
Alliance Design   
The study of alliance design examines the determinants of the governance 
arrangements negotiated by partners at the outset of an alliance. At a high level, those 
arrangements include the overarching legal structure of the alliance: is it governed purely 
by contract or does it include any equity components, such as minority investments by 
either party or the creation of an autonomous company—a joint venture (JV)—in which 
each participant takes up a stake? At a more granular level, alliance design encompasses 
contractual specifications (e.g., information-sharing procedures and conditions that would 
trigger renegotiation of alliance arrangements or penalties) and informal arrangements 
(e.g., non-contractual agreements and promises about commitments, inter-organizational 
liaisons, and flexible adjustments in the future).  
The cooperation perspective on alliance design. The central argument of the 
cooperation perspective on alliance design is that firms trade off the perceived 
cooperation benefits of formal governance arrangements with the higher costs of such 
measures. Carefully designed contractual features can increase the probability of 
detecting and penalizing opportunistic behavior (Carson, Madhok, & Wu, 2006; Parkhe, 
1993);
16 researchers have suggested that equity JVs can align incentives thanks to the 
                                                        
16 For example, a contract can specify in detail the responsibilities of the parties 
and penalties for nonconformance, reducing the probability of shirking. It can include 
contingencies as to when and how the relationship can be terminated, reducing the 
probability of holdup. Finally, it can impose restrictions—backed up by appropriate 
penalties—that limit the use of tangible or intangible resources.    30 
mutual exchange of hostages in the form of equity investments, robust monitoring 
mechanisms,  and a clear mechanism for distributing the gains of collaboration (Hennart, 
1988; Kogut, 1988).  But crafting such formal structures can be expensive: negotiating, 
implementing, and enforcing highly detailed contracts involves significant legal costs and 
managerial attention (Crocker & Reynolds, 1993), and creating autonomous entities like 
JVs entails further capital commitments and exit costs (Kogut, 1988; Sampson, 2004). 
Thus forward-looking firms are likely to take on the expense of formal structures only if 
there is a high ex-ante risk of cooperation failures. Transaction-cost economists have 
focused on exchange hazards that increase vulnerability to opportunism; sociologists and 
organization theorists also consider factors that decrease the threat of opportunism, such 
as the relationship between the partners and the larger social structures surrounding them.  
Certain characteristics of an alliance can increase the likely dangers of 
cooperation failure, and thus necessitate more formal governance in the form of detailed 
contracts or hierarchical governance structures. For example, researchers have show that 
partners‘ asset specificity is associated with greater contractual protections to mitigate the 
dangers of holdup (Mellewigt, Madhok, & Weibel, 2007; Mesquita & Brush, 2008; 
Parkhe, 1993).
17 Greater scope can increase the risk of shirking, thus calling for the 
alignment of incentives and monitoring mechanisms that JV governance can provide 
(Oxley, 1997; Oxley & Sampson, 2004; Sampson, 2004). For the same reason, JVs are 
often used in situations characterized by risk of misappropriation and knowledge leakage, 
                                                        
17 For example, such agreements could reduce the need for further renegotiation 
to adapt to easily foreseen contingencies. Such renegotiations typically allow the partner 
with the dependence advantage to appropriate more of the gains of exchange (Hamel, 
1991).    31 
e.g., R&D alliances in industries with poor intellectual-property rights (Gulati, 1995a; 
Pisano, 1989).  
Sociologists and organization theorists complement this cooperation perspective 
by examining how social factors can lead to the selection of less formal governance 
arrangements. In direct extension of the transaction-cost argument, they have argued that 
accumulated trust and reputational concerns obviate the need for formal governance 
arrangements by reducing the perceived probability of opportunism and thus lowering the 
marginal benefits of costly contracts/equity investments (Gulati, 1995a). They have also 
suggested that excessive contractual formality may erode the accumulation of trust by 
implying insufficient confidence in others‘ integrity (Ghoshal & Moran, 1996) and by 
denying them opportunities to demonstrate their trustworthiness (Malhotra & Murnighan, 
2002; Molm, Takahashi, & Peterson, 2000). Thus actors in high-trust relationships may 
find it counterproductive to select highly formal governance arrangements, irrespective of 
their financial cost. The empirical research is generally supportive of these arguments. 
Prior experience, shared nationality (Gulati, 1995a), and structural proximity in the 
alliance network (Robinson & Stuart, 2007) all reduce the probability of selecting a joint-
venture structure. Similarly, contracts tend to be simpler when ex-ante opportunism 
concerns are less urgent due to partners‘ observed past behavior (Crocker & Reynolds, 
1993), or good reputations (Banerjee & Duflo, 2000). However, the prediction that prior 
partner-specific experience would lead to more complete contracts has had mixed 
empirical support: some studies have shown that repeat collaborations feature less 
complete contracts (Banerjee & Duflo, 2000; Corts & Singh, 2004; Kalnins & Mayer, 
2004), but others have found the opposite effect (Poppo & Zenger, 2002). As we will   32 
show below, the coordination perspective offers one explanation of that puzzle (for other 
explanations, see Puranam & Vanneste, 2009). 
The coordination perspective on alliance design. The preceding discussion 
assumes that actors choose formal and informal governance arrangements primarily to 
alleviate cooperation concerns. But as they draw up alliance contracts, organizations may 
also seek solutions to anticipated coordination challenges (Gulati et al., 2005; Vlaar et al., 
2006; White & Lui, 2005) or apply lessons of previously encountered coordination 
challenges (Litwak & Hylton, 1962). Such a coordination perspective on alliance-design 
decisions—specifically, partners‘ choices of contractual structure and specific contractual 
clauses—is receiving increasing attention.  
More recent research has begun to consider how such formal structures as 
dedicated joint-venture organizations and detailed contracts can address not only 
cooperation issues but also coordination issues (Gulati et al., 2005; Puranam & Vanneste, 
2009; Vlaar et al., 2006; White & Lui, 2005). As we noted in our description of the 
structural school of thought on inter-organizational coordination, joint-venture structures 
can facilitate coordination by providing robust authority structures and enforcement 
mechanisms, dedicated staff, and opportunities to devise structures and procedures that fit 
the purpose of the alliance (Gulati & Singh, 1998). Detailed contracts can help address 
coordination challenges (Mellewigt et al., 2007; Reuer & Arino, 2007) by specifying 
tasks, roles, and responsibilities (Carson et al., 2006; Mayer & Argyres, 2004); 
contingency plans and responses (Ring & Van de Ven, 1994), and information-sharing 
and feedback channels (Argyres & Mayer, 2007) to ensure smooth operation. Forward-
looking firms are likely to weigh those benefits against the higher costs of both JVs and   33 
detailed contracts and to select more formal governance when their coordination needs 
are highest, such as in situations characterized by high task uncertainty and 
interdependence (Gulati & Singh, 1998; Mesquita & Brush, 2008), incompatibilities 
stemming from partner diversity (White, 2005), or high costs for coordination failure 
(Mellewigt et al., 2007). 
Firms may design contractual clauses at the outset not only to meet anticipated 
coordination requirements but also in response to experience gained from past 
collaborations.
 18 Though they do not always frame the debate explicitly in coordination 
terms, some scholars have argued that partner-specific experiences will influence which 
coordination issues partners anticipate and which coordination mechanisms they use in 
those partnerships. Some of the mechanism for coordination that partners develop over 
time can become routines that are implemented informally (Reuer & Arino, 2007), but 
some will be formalized in contracts that effectively serve as ―repositories of knowledge‖ 
distilling the lessons of past coordination failures (Argyres & Mayer, 2007; Argyres, 
Bercovitz, & Mayer, 2007). For example, partners‘ experiences of misunderstandings 
resulting from poor informal communication in prior alliances may prompt them to 
formalize information-exchange provisions in their subsequent alliance contracts (Mayer 
& Argyres, 2004). 
                                                        
18 Such experiential learning also occurs in the design of cooperation-related 
contractual clauses. However, coordination-related clauses are usually more idiosyncratic 
to the task and the partners, while cooperation-related clauses are frequently standardized 
into legal boilerplate (Vanneste & Puranam, 2010). Furthermore, knowledge of the 
design of coordination-related clauses typically resides with the organization‘s managers, 
while the design of cooperation-related clauses is often handled by external counsel 
(Argyres & Mayer, 2007).   34 
Discussion. Our review of the drivers of alliance-design decisions reveals some 
overlap in the predictions of the two perspectives. Formal contracts and JV structures can 
be used to alleviate both cooperation- and coordination-related concerns arising from the 
task structure. For example, the empirical finding that R&D-intensive partnerships tend 
to employ more hierarchical joint-venture governance structures may be due to 
anticipated cooperation-related challenges like the difficulty of monitoring and control 
(Oxley, 1997; Pisano, 1989), or to ex ante coordination-related challenges like the likely 
complex and ambiguous interdependencies that arise in such ties (Gulati & Singh, 1998). 
This overlap suggests the need for better disentangling the actual mechanisms behind 
certain taken-for-granted empirical relationships in alliance design. 
However, the coordination perspective offers more than further justification for 
some cooperation-based predictions. For example, it can transcend the simple 
dichotomies of equity vs. non-equity structures, and even broad categorizations of 
contractual items used in prior research from a cooperation perspective, to provide 
greater insight into the specific coordination mechanisms actually used in alliances. It 
raises a host of interesting questions. For example, are formal hierarchical structures 
universally preferred for alliances that involve significant coordination requirements? Or 
are more informal and flexible structures, or structures more closely integrated with the 
parent organizations, more beneficial to achieve greater coordination?  
Finally, the coordination perspective can shed light on some puzzling 
contradictions within the cooperation perspective, such as the paradox of simultaneous 
increase in trust and contractual complexity in some repeat partnerships (Poppo & 
Zenger, 2002). This finding appears to conflict with the predictions of sociologists and   35 
social psychologists that increased trust arising from repeated interactions will reduce the 
need for contractual safeguards (Macaulay, 1963; Malhotra & Murnighan, 2002; Molm et 
al., 2000). This anomaly could be explained by the fact that repeated ties lead to 
increased partner-specific learning that in turn reduces coordination costs which is 
subsequently reflected in looser contracts. In support of such an argument, a separate 
analysis of cooperation- and coordination-related contractual clauses reveals that only the 
latter increase in number with partner-specific experience (Vanneste & Puranam, 2010). 
As a result, it is likely that partners‘ cooperation and coordination experiences have 
distinct effects on design choices, and points out promising venues for research. For 
example, under what circumstances is learning from past alliances carried over into 
formal contracts, and when is it discarded? When is learning from past experiences 
codified in contracts—thus increasing contractual complexity—and when is it embodied 
in informal routines that reduce the need for codification, thus decreasing contractual 
complexity? What are the performance consequences of such transfers of experience? Is 
experience more likely to facilitate coordination, or to impair it as lessons learned are 
mistakenly applied to the wrong situations?  
Post-Formation Dynamics  
No matter how carefully organizations strategize about partner selection and 
initial governance setup, many scholars believe that ―managing the alliance relationship 
over time is usually more important‖ (Doz & Hamel, 1998: XV). After all, it is during 
actual implementation of the alliance that partners may begin engaging in opportunistic 
behavior that leads to cooperation failures.  And it is during implementation that actual 
coordination challenges become apparent and coordination failures occur. The research   36 
on post-formation dynamics in alliances largely seeks to explain how and why partners 
implement and change the alliance agreement over the course of the relationship. 
Particular attention is paid to how shortcomings in the initial alliance setup, endogenous 
developments within the alliance, and shifts in its external environment influence 
partners‘ implementation and adaptation choices. 
  The cooperation perspective on post-formation dynamics. The cooperation 
perspective on post-formation dynamics explains implementation choices and alterations 
of alliance arrangements as functions of either (1) partners‘ attempts to address or exploit 
openings for opportunistic behavior, or (2) partners‘ changing levels of commitment and 
trust.  
Some efforts to alter initial cooperation agreements are pursued to fix flaws in the 
initial design, or to accommodate the changing goals of one or both the partners. 
Assuming bounded rationality, alliance managers are apt to make errors of commission 
or omission in their initial alliance designs that provide openings for opportunistic 
behavior. For example, they may choose formal structures that later turn out to be 
inappropriate (Sampson, 2004) or fail to specify important contractual clauses, such as 
monitoring or exit provisions (Gulati, Sytch, & Mehrotra, 2008). The greater the 
vulnerability or perceived disadvantage a partner feels due to weak contractual 
safeguards (Reuer & Arino, 2002), the more likely they are to bargain for corrective 
bilateral/multilateral solutions in order to better align incentives and prevent cooperation 
failures. Emergent internal developments, such as a partner‘s strategic reorientation, can 
also lead to misalignment of incentives and thus may necessitate renegotiation and   37 
readjustment of initial agreements to ensure sustained cooperation in the relationship 
(Bamford et al., 2004). 
  Partners‘ attempts to ―fix‖ agreements to ensure cooperation may, of course, 
embody agendas other than the equity or stability of the partnership. Specifically, 
partners may seek to exploit advantages in bargaining power to extract a more favorable 
agreement about contributions and payoffs in the alliance. Asymmetric bargaining 
positions may date back to the very beginning of the relationship: for example, higher 
asset specificity increases the likelihood of renegotiation, arguably because of the 
asymmetries in dependence that it creates (Reuer, Zollo, & Singh, 2002). But such 
asymmetries can also arise endogenously in the course of the alliance: for example, in 
learning alliances the fastest-learning partner may be able to force a renegotiation of 
terms and to demand concessions from slower-learning partners (Hamel, 1991; Inkpen & 
Beamish, 1997; Khanna, Gulati, & Nohria, 1998). As a rule, any initial contractual 
deficiencies and emergent internal or external developments can lead to incentive 
misalignment and promote renegotiation of the arrangement. 
To characterize the post-formation phase as a purely economically motivated 
struggle for a bigger portion of the pie and more advantageous terms would be to ignore 
social dynamics that can also explain formal and informal adjustments to these 
agreements during this phase. From a cooperation lens, the dynamics within these 
partnerships can also be positive in that they lead to greater cooperation and reduced risk. 
To the extent that the alliance satisfies partners‘ expectations, they may experience a 
virtuous cycle of escalating relational commitments and trust (Doz, 1996; Larson, 1992; 
Ring & Van de Ven, 1994). Joint accomplishments can create a feeling of strategic   38 
interdependence and anticipation of greater gains in the future, which can increase the 
partners‘ commitment to the stability of the relationship (Heide & Miner, 1992; Poppo et 
al., 2008). And an accumulating track record of mutual honesty can solidify personal 
bonds between boundary spanners, engender positive affect (Lawler, Thye, & Yoon, 
2000; Uzzi, 1999), and foster interpersonal trust (Gulati & Sytch, 2008), which over time 
can become institutionalized as inter-organizational trust (Zaheer et al., 1998). Enhanced 
commitment and trust can in turn facilitate renegotiation of formal agreements, since 
actors are less likely to suspect underhanded motives (Reuer et al., 2002). Commitment 
and trust also facilitate informal adaptation in the absence of changes to formal 
documents, which is especially valuable in unpredictable and turbulent environments 
(Ring & Van de Ven, 1992).  
The relational attachment processes can also work in reverse, leading to more 
rigid and fragile cooperation. Unmet expectations and perceptions of opportunism can 
undermine partners‘ commitment and trust and diminish their ability to negotiate 
mutually satisfying solutions (Arino & de la Torre, 1998). Disappointed partners may 
insist on rigid adherence to the language of the contract (Faems, Janssens, Madhok, & 
Van Looy, 2008), thus reducing the prospects of informal adaptation..  
The coordination perspective on post-formation dynamics. The post-formation 
phase of an alliance puts the partners‘ motivation and commitment to the test; it also 
exposes weaknesses in initially specified coordination mechanisms when the real 
coordination needs of the joint effort become apparent. Some of the adjustments over the 
course of an alliance that may be attributed to shifting cooperation concerns may actually 
be rooted in the changing dynamics of coordination. In fact, many real-world examples of   39 
contract alterations and organizational adjustments address elements more relevant to 
day-to-day coordination of activities than to prevention of opportunism or appropriation 
of benefits (Mayer & Argyres, 2004). To some degree, this abrupt focus on coordination 
issues results from a lack of attention to coordination that is commonplace during earlier 
phases of the alliance life cycle; implementers are thus left to improvise and elaborate 
coordination mechanisms as the relationship evolves. The coordination perspective 
attributes such elaboration and adjustment of coordination mechanisms to partners‘ 
efforts to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of coordination, informed by effective 
or dysfunctional learning processes.  
Over the course of an alliance, participating organizations learn about their 
partners and about the task they aim to perform (cf. Reuer et al., 2002).  At the outset, 
they may harbor incomplete (or flat-out wrong) assumptions about their partners‘ 
resources, capabilities, and structural and cultural idiosyncrasies, and about the 
coordination requirements of the joint task. To the extent that their notions are 
erroneous—or that they do not reconcile their differences in perception —their 
specification of critical subtasks, interdependencies, and contingencies are apt to be 
incomplete or mistaken, and coordination failures more likely. Over time, however, the 
partners may develop a more accurate shared understanding of their joint task‘s 
coordination requirements, and of how their own organizational characteristics can 
complicate or help resolve coordination issues. For example, a small entrepreneurial firm 
may gradually grasp that its informal decision-making process does not work in 
collaborations with large bureaucratic organizations (Doz, 1996); and a U.S. company 
may learn how to navigate its cultural and linguistic differences with its foreign partners   40 
(White, 2005). Much of this task-related learning is based on trial and error, on insights 
gained from coordination failures, and on near-misses in the course of the relationship. 
As an alliance unfolds, the partners may choose to alter and adapt organizational 
and administrative arrangements made for the alliance at the outset to improve the 
efficiency and effectiveness of coordination, and to improve alliance performance 
(Gulati, Lavie, & Singh, 2009; Zollo et al., 2002). They may revise their division of 
labor, formalizing their learning in contract clauses that specify accountability, 
contingency planning, and communication channels (Argyres et al., 2007; Mayer & 
Argyres, 2004). But a host of informal adjustments are possible too. Growing familiarity 
with partners‘ key decision-makers allows for formation of informal joint problem-
solving workgroups (Faems et al., 2008); better mutual understanding supports 
development of a shared knowledge base and shared language, both of which smooth 
communication (Stuart, 1998; Uzzi, 1997); and improved understanding of causal links 
between individual actions and collective outcomes (Kogut, 2000) helps pinpoint 
opportunities for investment in relationship-specific assets to enhance compatibility 
(Dyer & Singh, 1998). Ultimately, some of the partners‘ experiential learning will be 
incorporated into relationship-specific or more general routines that can improved 
coordination (Reuer & Arino, 2007). 
But inter-organizational learning processes do not always lead to better 
coordination (Goerzen, 2007; Hoang & Rothaermel, 2005). Mutual learning may prove to 
be maladaptive if locks partners into competency traps and renders them unwilling to 
abandon established but suboptimal inter-organizational processes and routines (Levitt &   41 
March, 1988).
19 The consequences of such rigidities may be especially damaging when 
the external environment or the nature of the alliance changes, requiring new formal 
structures and informal routines wholly unlike those the partners have previously used 
(Zollo & Reuer, 2010). 
Discussion. In conclusion, the coordination perspective adds nuance to the 
cooperation-based view of post-formation dynamics. Learning about partners‘ 
commitments and intentions is an important aspect of the development of a cooperative 
relationship, but the coordination perspective also emphasizes learning about the task, 
about partners‘ capabilities and resources, and about how they can be most efficiently 
combined. There are many opportunities here for future research to advance our 
understanding of when and how formal and informal coordination mechanisms are 
changed, and how such changes affect the efficiency and effectiveness of coordination 
(for a promising start, see Argyres & Mayer, 2007; Vanneste & Puranam, 2010; Zollo & 
Reuer, 2010).  
Our review also suggests a possible tension between cooperation- and 
coordination-related considerations during the post-formation phase: open 
communication and knowledge sharing may be desirable from a coordination standpoint, 
to reduce the likelihood of incompatibilities, omissions, and misallocations, but 
undesirable from a cooperation standpoint if the likelihood of knowledge spillovers and 
misappropriations increases in the process. By implication, more extensive coordination 
provisions may require a certain level of cooperativeness and trust among partners. 
                                                        
19 Such rigidities may be harder to overcome in alliances than in organizations 
because process changes can rarely be imposed by fiat and typically must be negotiated 
among the partners (Rogers & Whetten, 1982).   42 
Conversely, effective inter-organizational coordination that minimizes unanticipated 
behaviors and problems during operation of the alliance may be instrumental in 
sustaining and promoting partners‘ commitment and trust. The next section extends this 
line of reasoning and elaborates different models of how cooperation and coordination 
can be interrelated, and how they affect alliance outcomes. 
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IV. INTEGRATING THE COOPERATION                                                                               
AND COORDINATION PERSPECTIVES 
 
Our review of cooperation- and coordination related research so far has shown 
that most studies consider cooperation and coordination issues in isolation from each 
other. A few recent studies, however, have begun to examine how cooperation and 
coordination issues interrelate, how they independently or jointly impact alliance 
outcomes, and how they may in turn by influenced by those outcomes. Some studies 
imply that the level of cooperation within a relationship can influence its adaptiveness – 
and thus the quality of the coordination – and vice versa (Faems et al., 2008). Others 
point towards the possibility that cooperation and coordination-related relationship 
characteristics shape performance interactively rather than independently (Luo, 2002). 
Still other studies suggest that key aspects of the relationship, such as the level of 
cooperation, could themselves be shaped by partners‘ subjective performance evaluations  
(Ring & Van de Ven, 1994). To date there is little systematic discussion of the theoretical 
foundations of those relationships between cooperation, coordination, and performance, 
and even less of their theoretical and practical implications. 
In this section, we will examine different ways in which the relationship among 
cooperation, coordination, and performance can be conceptualized, and what each 
approach means for alliance researchers and practitioners (see Table 3). We suggest that 
scholars‘ perspectives on the relationship between cooperation and coordination differ 
along two dimensions: (1) are cooperation and coordination issues and solutions 
independent or interdependent? and (2) is the relationship between cooperation and   44 
coordination objectively identifiable or subjectively constructed? We build on these two 
distinctions to articulate three conceptions. The independent model, implicitly assumed in 
much of the literature, is a simple model in which cooperation and coordination do not 
influence each other, and both have a simple additive relationship to performance. This 
model has significant limitations in its portrayal of alliances. The interdependent model 
examines the implications of mutual influence between cooperation and coordination and 
their superadditive effect on performance, due either to synergies or to mutual 
reinforcement. This model provides a richer and more realistic conceptualization of 
alliance phenomena. Finally, we suggest an interpretive perspective, which allows for the 
possibility that misconstruals and biased attributions of relationships among cooperation, 
coordination, and performance shape alliance decisions and outcomes (see Table 3). The 
interpretive view of the relationship between cooperation, coordination, and performance 
is least explored in the existing alliance literature, but holds significant promise for future 
research as it highlights the unexplored cognitive micro-foundations that may underlie 
alliance dynamics. 
==================Insert table 3 about here=================== 
The independent model 
The most basic approach to the question of how cooperation and coordination 
interrelate suggests that the two phenomena are independent of each other and have a 
simple additive effect (2 + 2 = 4) on alliance outcomes. This additive effect relies on the 
assumption—implicit in most studies that consider only one or the other in isolation, and 
explicit in some studies that consider both phenomena (Gulati & Singh, 1998)—that   45 
cooperation and coordination issues in a partnership occur independently of each other, 
and independently affect alliance outcomes.
20 Cooperation- and coordination-related 
successes are assumed to have separate effects on alliance outcomes; for instance, better 
cooperation is assumed to lead to higher performance independent of coordination efforts 
and vice versa (Das & Teng, 1998; Heath & Staudenmayer, 2000; Kretschmer & 
Puranam, 2008). Cooperation and coordination problems are assumed to ―pile up‖ in an 
alliance, but not to influence each other. They can thus be tackled separately with 
distinctive remedial interventions, e.g., the threat of sanctions/penalties to improve 
cooperation, or better planning to improve coordination.  
The assumption of independence does not preclude, however, that some 
interventions can affect both cooperation and coordination. For example, the JV form 
promotes clear and focused interaction—a coordination benefit—and ensures that 
activities and information intended to be outside the scope of the alliance are not 
transparent to or shared with partners—a cooperation benefit (Oxley & Wada, 2009). 
Investments in systems or process integration can improve coordination but 
simultaneously constitute relationship-specific investments that can serve as ―mutual 
hostages‖ and reduce relationship-ending opportunism (Dyer, 1997). Likewise, informal 
team-building efforts can enhance both trust and relational attachment, a cooperation-
related benefit, and shared understanding of critical interdependencies, a coordination-
related benefit.  
                                                        
20 Most studies implicitly assume either cooperation or coordination problems to 
be solved or trivial; only few make this assumption explicit (see, e.g. Puranam, Singh, & 
Chaudhuri, 2009 for exception). In both cases, the exclusive focus on either cooperation 
or coordination systematically precludes consideration of possible influences of one on 
the other.   46 
The normative implication of the model is that alliance managers can tackle 
cooperation and coordination issues separately—cooperation and coordination experts or 
teams could work independently—and that even an exclusive focus on one or the other 
would be a feasible approach to managing alliances. By extension, partners might also be 
able to choose, strategically and situationally, to concentrate their attention and resource 
allocation exclusively on cooperation or coordination if doing so seems likely to further 
alliance goals. Such strategic choices may depend on partners‘ assessment of (1) the 
primary challenges of the alliance, and (2) which sphere they can more feasibly and 
successfully influence.  
First, the scope and specific tasks of the alliance would influence partners‘ 
perception of where the primary challenges lie and thus bias them toward cooperation or 
coordination (Mellewigt et al., 2007; Mesquita & Brush, 2008). For example, in alliances 
whose purpose is integrating logistics processes, such as those between manufacturers 
and shipping companies, the predominant issues are likely to pertain to coordination. In 
alliances engaged in the unidirectional transfer of know-how, by contrast, issues of 
appropriation of intellectual property loom large, and thus cooperation issues may 
command the most attention(Oxley, 1997).  
Second, partners‘ choices of focus depend on which sphere they believe they can 
influence more easily. This path of least resistance may be particularly prevalent when 
partners cannot improve cooperation and coordination simultaneously or to the same 
degree, and therefore have to tolerate known shortcomings that are not easily fixed. In an 
exploratory R&D alliance, for example, joint activities and crucial interfaces may be 
difficult to anticipate and plan; thus partners may focus on maintaining and enhancing   47 
cooperation to ensure continuing engagement and commitment despite inefficiencies or 
false starts attributable to coordination difficulties.  
Such substitutions suggest that cooperation and coordination efforts may be to 
some degree equifinal in their contribution to attainment of alliance goals. In the sense 
that either cooperation or coordination efforts can help reduce overall risk (relational and 
operational risk combined) in the relationship or lower the overall cost of cooperation and 
coordination, and thus contribute to partners‘ satisfaction and belief in the feasibility of 
the collaborative effort, both may indeed have substitutive effects on alliance outcomes.  
This independent model reviewed above has two limitations. First, not all 
cooperation and coordination efforts are compatible. Thus while a particular cooperation 
agreement and particular coordination mechanisms may be effective at addressing 
specific issues in their separate realms, when implemented together they may conflict and 
negatively impact alliance outcomes. For example, highly restrictive and punitive 
intellectual-property ownership clauses borne out of R&D alliance partners‘ knowledge-
leakage and misappropriation worries may be effective at preventing cooperation failures. 
But they may clash with coordination provisions for extensive knowledge sharing and 
communication, implemented to handle the difficult-to-predict interdependencies and 
high uncertainty of R&D efforts (Hamel, 1991; Larsson, Bengtsson, Henriksson, & 
Sparks, 1998; Pisano, 1989).  
Second, in extreme circumstances the assumption of independence and 
substitutability may break down. It is difficult to conceive of effective coordination 
efforts in the absence of any cooperation among partners: given that inter-organizational   48 
coordination requires some effort from the participants, a minimum level of sustained and 
predictable commitment to joint effort is a prerequisite for any alignment of actions 
(Gerwin & Ferris, 2004). And to the degree that coordination serves the attainment of 
alliance goals, it is necessarily evaluated with reference to those goals (i.e., the 
cooperation agreements). At the same time, cooperation in the absence of coordination 
efforts seems similarly impossible: cooperation entails goal-directed collective action, 
and thus requires a certain minimum of coordination (e.g., incorporation of alliance-
related activities and goals into partner organizations‘ portfolios of activities and goals). 
Following this reasoning, cooperation and coordination appear to be necessary and 
complementary elements in any alliance—an assumption that the second interrelationship 
model builds on. 
The interdependent model  
Some studies have suggested that cooperation and coordination depend on and 
influence each other (for the intra-organizational context, see e.g., Kretschmer & 
Puranam, 2008; for the inter-organizational context, see e.g., McEvily, Perrone, & 
Zaheer, 2003), and have a joint impact on alliance outcomes that exceeds their combined 
individual impacts. We call this the interdependent model.
21 It addresses a key limitation 
of the independent model of cooperation and coordination highlighted in the previous 
section: for cooperation to have any positive impact on alliance outcomes, some minimal 
coordination must have been achieved, and vice versa. In other words, partners will not 
                                                        
21 The interdependencies can play out at two different levels. First, the quality of 
the cooperation is dependent on the quality of the coordination and vice versa. Second, 
the marginal effect of quality of cooperation on outcomes is dependent on the quality of 
the coordination and vice versa: in other words, there is a superadditive effect of 
cooperation and coordination on performance.   49 
be able to effectively coordinate in the absence of sustained agreement and reliable 
commitment regarding the inputs and intended outputs of the partnership; nor will they 
be able to put the pledged inputs to productive use without at least a rudimentary 
agreement on coordination. Though typically not articulated in terms of cooperation and 
coordination, such an interdependent, mutually required ―minimum-threshold‖ 
conception has been put forth for both the intra- and inter-organizational contexts 
(Bachmann, 2001; Dosi, Levinthal, & Marengo, 2003; Gulati, 2010).  
Assuming that this ―minimum-threshold‖ condition is met—that minimum levels 
of cooperation and coordination have been achieved—scholars have focused on whether 
cooperation and coordination in combination produce a superadditive effect on alliance 
outcomes (2 + 2 = 5). Two alternative logics, whose assumptions differ about how tightly 
cooperation and coordination issues are interwoven, can account for such a superadditive 
effect: inherent complementarity, which suggests that a change in the extent or quality of 
cooperation changes the impact of existing coordination efforts and vice versa; and 
mutual incremental reinforcement, which suggest that a change in the extent or quality of 
cooperation leads to subsequent changes in coordination efforts and vice versa, resulting 
in an interactive effect over time.  
Inherent complementarities. According to the logic of complementarity, 
increasing cooperation should enhance the marginal impact of a given level of 
coordination and vice versa. This logic can be understood in a general sense, such that 
better cooperation makes any coordination effort more beneficial and vice versa, or in the 
more specific sense that a particular cooperation provision enhances the effectiveness of a 
particular coordination mechanism or vice versa. For example, Poppo and Zenger (2002)   50 
showed that the benefits of relational governance (a cooperation provision) are magnified 
by extensive contractual clauses for the administrative implementation of the relationship 
(a coordination mechanism). Luo (2002) suggested that contractual adaptiveness—an 
important aspect of effective coordination—has the greatest impact in high-trust 
relationships.
22 The anticipation of such complementarity benefits may also drive 
decisions to form alliances with potential partners that rank highly on cooperation criteria 
(e.g., prior relationships or indirect connections) and on coordination criteria (e.g., 
compatibility of resources) (Mitsuhashi & Greve, 2009).  
The complementary effects reported in these studies suggest that cooperation and 
coordination issues may be intricately interwoven, especially when it comes to 
adaptiveness, as in Luo‘s (2002) study, and sustained commitment to the alliance, as in 
Poppo and Zenger‘s (2002). Adaptiveness can be explained as a result of high-quality 
cooperation among partners that makes it easier to adjust existing coordination 
mechanisms flexibly. Partners will be less prone to suspect hidden agendas and 
disadvantageous consequences of such adjustments. Hence successful coordination of 
activities, even in the face of unanticipated contingencies, becomes less effortful and 
costly. In contrast, low cooperativeness can turn elaborate coordination provisions into a 
liability as partners cling to ineffectual, outdated mechanisms.  
Sustained commitment to the alliance can be similarly explained as a complex 
interplay between cooperation and coordination. Detailed up-front specification of 
                                                        
22 Note that in the Poppo and Zenger (2002) study, the sheer extent of 
coordination arrangements produces a complementary benefit to cooperation 
arrangements, independent of the effectiveness of those arrangements (i.e., their proximal 
outcomes). In Luo‘s (2002) study, however, it is the quality of cooperation, i.e., the level 
of achieved trust that underlies such complementarity.    51 
coordination mechanisms (during the design stage) makes successful coordination over 
the course of the partnership more likely, ensures efficient use of partners‘ contributions, 
reduces process losses, and provides clear guidelines for how partners will interact. All of 
this improves foreseeability, which not only facilitates coordination but also reduces the 
partners‘ perceived level of overall risk: given the solid administrative basis of the 
partnership, partners have transparency over what is going on (Carson et al., 2006). 
Transparency and communication among partners enhance shared understanding of 
mutual expectations and alleviate fears of partner misconduct, and can engender trust and 
group identity (Agarwal, Croson, & Mahoney, 2010; Zeng & Chen, 2003). These 
conditions make premature termination of the relationship less likely: partners are 
unlikely to pull the plug and reduce contributions or commitment immediately when the 
partnership encounters small internal or external challenges; they may even have pre-
specified coordinated responses to such occurrences.   
Mutual incremental reinforcement. According to reinforcement logic, more 
extensive cooperation (e.g., increased strategic interdependence and more ambitious 
goals) and/or good cooperation outcomes (equity, trust, goal attainment, etc.) encourage 
subsequent strengthening of coordination efforts. Inversely, more extensive coordination 
(deeper integration of partners‘ processes and systems) and/or good coordination 
outcomes (effectiveness and efficiency) encourage subsequent increase in the extent of 
cooperation (i.e., more contributions or additional goals), possibly leading to a positive 
spiraling effect. As a result, cooperation/coordination synergies would be achieved over 
time even if no complementarity effects existed at any given moment. The mechanisms 
that cause such reinforcement and reinforcement loops warrant some elaboration.    52 
Empirical studies suggest that the extent of inter-organizational coordination may 
change in response to strategically chosen levels of interdependence (Dyer, 1996, 1997). 
Similarly, high levels of cooperativeness can promote greater willingness to invest in 
relationship-specific assets (co-located facilities, integrated IT systems, shared routines 
and structures) as organizations gain confidence that their partners will not exploit this 
new vulnerability via holdup (Larson, 1992). A number of studies have also suggested 
that trust alleviates appropriation and misuse worries and thus facilitates the exchange of 
fine-grained and sensitive information that may be critical to successful coordination 
(Kale et al., 2000; Uzzi, 1997). Lastly, successful cooperation promotes continuance of 
the relationship and thus opportunities to standardize and formalize agreed-on processes 
over time, leading to more elaborate coordination mechanisms (Poppo & Zenger, 2002: 
713). 
Coordination can also promote more extensive cooperation. Formalized 
procedures for problem solving, decision making, and conflict resolution can enhance the 
predictability of interactions and give partners a sense of procedural justice (Luo, 2005): 
problems and tensions are resolved according to mutually agreed-on rules and 
procedures, which over time encourage partners to extend the scope of their cooperation, 
i.e., to add activities and domains that they may previously have considered too sensitive 
or risky. Similarly, the efficiency benefits of successful coordination may lead partners to 
make a more positive cost-benefit assessment of the alliance as a whole, and to 
unilaterally or multilaterally commit more resources.   
Mutual positive reinforcement between levels of cooperation and coordination 
can lead to a virtuous cycle whereby cooperation enhances coordination by facilitating   53 
information exchange and relationship-specific investments, and coordination in turn 
encourages cooperation by promoting clear standards of behavior and performance, 
procedural justice, and perceptions of efficient value creation. Such positive cycles, 
predicted originally by Ring and Van de Ven (1994), have been empirically identified in 
some real-world alliances (Doz, 1996; Faems et al., 2008). 
Reinforcement loops are not exclusive to cooperation and coordination efforts; 
they characterize cooperation and coordination problems too. Mutual reinforcement of 
such problems suggests that they not only pile up but also spill over into each other, and 
can lead to co-erosion of cooperation and coordination. Economic inefficiency due to 
coordination failures can erode partners‘ commitment to the alliance over time. When 
cooperation failures fuel worry about the stability and benefits of the relationship, 
partners may doubt that effortful forms of coordination are worth the effort. Likewise, 
low cooperativeness can manifest itself in coordination activities that minimize individual 
efforts (e.g., refusal to adjust internal technical and administrative standards to partners‘ 
standards), minimize individual risks (e.g., refusal to share proprietary knowledge), and 
maximize individual benefits (e.g., assertion of decision-making rights and access to 
proprietary knowledge). Founded or unfounded suspicion about opportunistic behavior 
can lead to lingering conflicts over coordination, and may lead partners to seal off 
information critical to coordination, ultimately causing unresolved coordination issues to 
worsen and coordination gaps to widen (Arino & de la Torre, 1998). 
The normative implications of both complementarity and reinforcement logic 
seem to support a balanced approach, equally attentive to ensuring high levels of 
cooperation and coordination at the beginning of an alliance. Such an approach may   54 
trigger complementarities, and can kick off positive reinforcement loops starting from 
either cooperation or coordination. The complementarities logic in particular suggests 
that a single-minded focus on cooperation or coordination issues alone may not be 
successful. The reinforcement logic, on the other hand, suggests that alliance partners 
may benefit from positive momentum once they have achieved a certain level of 
cooperation and coordination success, an incremental and apparently perpetual increase 
in one factor following on the successful outcomes of the other.  
But this more complex and dynamic perspective on the relationship between 
cooperation and coordination and its impact on alliance outcomes has a number of 
limitations. First, both logics leave unanswered whether the positive and negative 
influences of cooperation on coordination and vice versa are symmetrical—that is, 
whether weaknesses erode strengths, or strengths help repair weaknesses. For example, if 
alliance partners are mutually wary but have robust planning procedures in place, would 
successful coordination help to improve trust? Or would the trust problems undermine the 
coordination successes? In general, strong cooperation and weak coordination may be a 
better basis for sustained joint effort than strong coordination and weak cooperation: high 
mutual trust and commitment may be more likely to motivate partners to double down to 
solve remaining operational issues than would ―mere‖ operational efficiencies to cause 
them to revise their assessments of cooperativeness in the relationship. However, alliance 
partners‘ differential capabilities for fostering trust or figuring out complex task 
interdependencies may reverse that prediction. 
Second, both the complementarity and reinforcement logics leave open whether 
positive joint effects occur in perpetuity, and irrespective of the level of cooperation and   55 
coordination achieved, or decrease at certain thresholds or under certain conditions. It is 
unclear, for example, at what level of cooperation or coordination positive reinforcement 
loops begin and under what conditions they may break down. An infinite positive loop 
seems unrealistic, as alliance partners may not infinitely escalate their commitment, or 
become infinitely trusting, merely because inter-organizational coordination has been 
increasingly successful; they may have inherent limits on what scope of cooperation they 
find desirable and how much they can trust (Oxley & Sampson, 2004). Likewise, some 
partnerships may struggle to match the growing scope of their alliance with more 
extensive coordination—the complexity of the relationship may exceed their abilities. 
From a behavioral perspective, it is questionable that alliance managers will want to or be 
able to pursue such reinforcement loops ad infinitum. Some scholars argue that the 
evolution of cooperation and coordination does not necessarily follow a positive or 
negative spiraling path continuously; instead it traces more complex, less predictable 
patterns over the course of the alliance (Van de Ven & Walker, 1984). 
 Complex evolutionary patterns of cooperation and coordination may be explained 
in part by partners‘ subjective and inter-subjectively negotiated perceptions of alliance 
performance and challenges. Thus a perspective that attributes alliance outcomes to 
cooperation or coordination issues can help explain how reinforcement loops begin and 
end, and whether the respective influences of cooperation and coordination outcomes on 
subsequent cooperation and coordination efforts differ.     
Towards an interpretive perspective  
Given the important role of partners‘ subjective understandings of cooperation 
and coordination issues in an alliance, we can usefully assume that partners‘   56 
understanding of the relationship between cooperation and coordination and its impact on 
performance outcomes is also shaped by subjective interpretations (Van de Ven & 
Walker, 1984). However, disentangling cooperation and coordination issues in an 
alliance, and accounting for their respective or joint contributions to alliance success (or 
failure), can be difficult for alliance managers. In our discussion of the interpretative 
perspective we suggest how heuristics and biases—specifically, attribution and 
confirmation biases—may influence alliance managers‘ interpretations, and point out 
implications for partners‘ behavior and for alliance outcomes. 
  
Attribution theory suggests that decision makers variously attribute causality to 
the self, to someone or something outside the self (Weiner, 1985), or to a relationship 
with another person (Eberly, Holley, Johnson, & Mitchell, 2011). We argue that 
relational attributions can be further distinguished as attributions to cooperation- or 
coordination-related factors: ―We failed because we did not trust each other‖ or ―We 
succeeded because our joint efforts followed a carefully devised plan.‖ Why are such 
post-hoc attributions important in alliances? Attributions of alliance success to partners‘ 
efforts (whether cooperation- or coordination-related), as opposed to fortuitous external 
circumstances, are likely to strengthen cooperation. Successful outcomes reduce 
uncertainty about the profitability of future interactions, and thus deepen the ―shadow of 
the future‖ between the two parties. Furthermore, satisfaction with alliance outcomes is 
likely to strengthen mutual ―psychological contracts‖ (Ring & Van de Ven, 1994), in turn 
facilitating communication, information sharing, and flexible adaptation.  
Misattributions of alliance success, however, can be detrimental for an alliance. If 
cooperation is incorrectly perceived as the key reason for success, alliance partners may   57 
mistakenly underemphasize the importance of coordination in future partnerships. By the 
same token, if coordination is inappropriately credited with saving the alliance despite 
perceived cooperation problems, partners may overdepend on smart coordination as a 
magic bullet for all kinds of problems in their alliance. Both kinds of misattributions – 
misattribution of success to cooperation or to coordination – may be transferred as 
experiential learning, and thus may perpetuate mistaken beliefs about what ‗really‘ drives 
alliance outcomes across multiple partnerships (Zollo & Reuer, 2010).
23   
Attributing alliance failure can be even more consequential, because cooperation 
and coordination failures imply different solutions. A perception of cooperation failure 
often raises doubt about the partner‘s essential character, which can cause unwillingness 
to ―play the sucker‖ or contribute further to the relationship (Kerr, 1983; Schnake, 1991). 
Especially in formerly high-trust situations, the feeling of betrayal can provoke irrational 
vendetta-style responses (Uzzi, 1997). Such actions can provoke retaliation (especially if 
the target perceives itself to be unfairly blamed), potentially making attribution of 
performance shortcomings to cooperation failure a self-fulfilling prophesy. If the reason 
for failure is misidentified as cooperation-related, alliance partners may ―throw out the 
baby with the bathwater‖ in the sense that they may terminate a potentially productive 
relationship when relatively minor coordination tweaks could have remedied the 
problem.  
                                                        
23 Misattributions of alliance success can initially fuel the reinforcement 
loops between cooperation and coordination but can also account for their eventual 
breakdown.  There are limits to how much investment in cooperation will pay off as 
better coordination and vice versa. If they overinvest in the wrong tools to insure 
collaboration success, actors may not be spending their resources wisely and may 
leave a real problem to fester.    58 
When attributing failure solely to coordination difficulties, by contrast, partners 
may pursue a more cool-headed, bureaucratic analysis. Was the coordination failure due 
to fundamental incompatibilities between the organizations? What kinds of adjustments 
are necessary to overcome it? If both sides decide that the problem is fixable and the 
costs tolerable, they may attempt to salvage the relationship by improving routines, 
enlarging the interaction interface (Faems et al., 2008), and/or investing more in co-
specialized coordination-enhancing assets (Larson, 1992). If the failure is misidentified as 
coordination-related, partners may ―throw good money after bad‖ by investing further in 
coordination but avoiding a frank cooperation-focused conversation with their partners.  
An emphasis on cooperation- or on coordination-related issues respectively to 
account for alliance successes (or failures) may be based on systematic attributional 
biases. Prior research suggests that individuals evaluate cooperation and coordination 
issues in collaborative efforts differently. A recent study shows, for example, that 
positive affect toward a partner is a precondition for individuals to even consider and 
evaluate the partner‘s competences and abilities (Casciaro & Lobo, 2008). This finding 
suggests that organizations may consider partners‘ cooperativeness first; coordination 
issues are considered later, contingent on the prior assessment.
   
Biased assessments of the root causes of alliance success or failure may also 
depend on the degree of responsibility that partners feel for cooperation and coordination. 
Research on fundamental attribution bias suggests that individuals tend to attribute 
negative outcomes to inexorable external forces, and positive outcomes to personal 
ability (Hewstone, 1990; Ross, 1977). When rationalizing an alliance failure, an 
organization may thus focus on the issues it had least influence over. Coordination is   59 
largely a joint responsibility, and the focal organization could conceivably have made 
better plans, communicated more regularly with partners, etc. But it may feel that it had 
little influence over the degree to which others honored their commitments and 
cooperated. Thus lack of cooperativeness may be more readily identified as a root cause 
of failure.  
However, an attributional bias toward invoking coordination issues to account for 
alliance performance shortcomings is conceivable too. Field and laboratory evidence 
suggests that the quality of the relationship between collaborators—a core aspect of 
cooperation—plays a key role in attributions of success and failure. Individuals tend to 
give the benefit of the doubt to those they perceive as members of an in-group, attributing 
success to their inherent character or ability while discounting failure as the product of 
external forces(Nisbett & Ross, 1980). Likewise, Uzzi (1997) argued that trust is the 
instinctive tendency to assume the best about the other party. Thus trusting partners may 
tend to attribute alliance problems to technical challenges (e.g., incompatibilities between 
systems, products, etc.) that could not be overcome despite everyone‘s best efforts. The 
potential for the quality of the cooperation to distort attribution may imply 
asymmetric roles for cooperation and coordination in the evolution of the relationship—
in other words, a high level of cooperation and a low level of coordination may be more 
conducive to relationship stability than the reverse (Casciaro & Lobo, 2008). Whether 
and under what circumstances an attributional bias toward cooperation or coordination 
issues prevails is an empirical question for future research.  
By extension, cognitive biases may also influence how decision makers think 
about the interrelationship of cooperation and coordination. They may have strong   60 
subjective preconceptions about what is really wrong, or what really works, in a 
particular partnership, and confirmation bias (Nickerson, 1998) may lead them to 
interpret various challenges and setbacks in keeping with those assessments. For 
example, preconceptions about low cooperativeness may make alliance managers highly 
aware of cooperation failures, but also cause them to explain coordination failures as 
ultimately rooted in cooperation deficiencies. By declaring cooperation problems to be 
the root cause of all problems in the alliance, they implicitly suggest interdependence 
between cooperation and coordination issues. Construing such an interdependent 
relationship allows partners to confirm and reinforce their preconception of fundamental 
cooperation problems in the partnership; coordination failures are thus interpreted as just 
another indicator of underlying cooperation problems. But the confirmation bias can 
work the other way too: partners who are convinced of each other‘s trustworthiness but 
who run into coordination problems may construe coordination and cooperation issues as 
independent and entirely unrelated. By precluding any possible interrelationship between 
the two, they avoid questioning their respective commitments and motivations.  
  An attribution-based perspective‘s emphasis on the subjective nature of 
performance evaluations and construals of the interrelationship between cooperation and 
coordination can have several normative implications. First, alliance managers need to be 
proactive about understanding the partner‘s attributions and construals, and about 
establishing shared understandings (Thomas & Trevino, 1993). What they may perceive 
to be good-faith efforts, and easily fixable coordination hiccups could appear to their 
partners as evidence of shirking and fundamental untrustworthiness. Second, timely 
communication to align each other‘s perceptions of the alliance‘s status quo ought to be   61 
supplemented by open and frank discussions to resolve nascent and emerging concerns, 
whether cooperation- or coordination-related. Unilateral actions leave room for 
misinterpretation, and may transform what began as a coordination failure into a real 
cooperation failure that kicks off a vicious cycle of relationship erosion (Arino & de la 
Torre, 1998).  
CONCLUSION 
This paper articulates the cooperation and coordination perspectives as distinct 
and complementary facets of collaboration in strategic alliances. The two perspectives 
can help identify different challenges and risks that alliance partners face, and highlight 
different sets of solutions that partners implement during the partner selection, alliance 
design, and post-formation phases to ensure collaborative success.  
Neither perspective can singlehandedly provide a comprehensive account of 
alliances. In fact, the systematic application of the two perspectives across the alliance 
life cycle reveals that each in isolation can be highly reductionist and sometimes 
misleading in its explanation of behavior and outcomes. From the cooperation 
perspective, relational concerns dominate—particularly concerns about partners‘ 
willingness to contribute to the alliance and equitably share its outcomes. The mantra 
here appears to be ―If there‘s a will, there‘s a way!‖: as long as partners get along, agree 
on goals, and maintain their commitment to the joint effort, any organizational problem is 
assumed to be possible, even trivial, for partners to resolve. From the coordination 
perspective, technical and administrative concerns—especially doubts and anxieties 
about partners‘ ability to realize the value proposition that the partnership is predicated   62 
on—eclipse all other problems. A preoccupation with the minutiae of interdependencies 
and inter-organizational interfaces, and with partners‘ abilities to orchestrate and 
administer the joint effort, often takes for granted partners‘ motivation and interest in the 
attainment of joint benefits. 
Integration of the two perspectives, then, seems to promise theoretically richer 
models of strategic alliances. However, our analysis of the alliance literature finds 
different conceptions of how cooperation and coordination issues interrelate and interact: 
simple independent/additive and interdependent/superadditive relationships are the most 
frequently proposed, but further elaboration of the underlying mechanisms and boundary 
conditions is warranted. In light of some of the limitations of the independent and 
interdependent approach, we suggest the subjective attributions of cooperation and 
coordination as a promising area for further exploration.  
Our paper offers a number of suggestions for future research. First and foremost, 
we encourage scholars to utilize carefully specified measures of cooperation and 
coordination when examining alliancing behavior and explaining alliance outcomes, and 
to focus on explicating mechanisms that isolate and also connect cooperation and 
coordination issues. Given the variety of cooperation and coordination concerns that 
partners face, there are plenty of opportunities to reexamine, refine, and reconcile our 
existing theories of alliance formation and design: when and how do cooperation 
concerns dominate coordination concerns and vice versa, and what is the impact of a 
relative emphasis on one or the other, or a particular balance, on the subsequent evolution 
of the partnership?    63 
A systematic examination of the relationship between cooperation and 
coordination also provides an opportunity to revisit central concepts in prior research on 
alliances, such as alliance capability, alliance learning, and trust. For example, are there 
differences in how quickly organizations accumulate skills to anticipate and manage 
cooperation- and coordination-related issues? If perceptions of trustworthiness are based 
on ability (a coordination issue) as well as on benevolence and integrity (cooperation 
issues) (Mayer et al., 1995), which leads most quickly to accumulation or loss of trust?  
Finally, our emphasis on subjective perceptions of cooperation and coordination 
dynamics encourages scholars to assess these perceptions more directly, and to examine 
how closely these perceptions align among partners.  Understanding of how asymmetries 
of perception can arise and be sustained is still very rudimentary. (For an examination of 
trust asymmetries in an acquisitions context, see Graebner, 2009.) Another venue for 
investigation is the degree to which subjective perceptions jibe with or are decoupled 
from more objective measures of cooperation- and coordination-related events in the 
alliance. Partners‘ positive or negative impressions of cooperativeness and coordination 
success may linger despite measurable changes in both spheres. Some scholars suggest 
that perceptions of cooperation failure may be more damaging and persistent than 
perceptions of coordination failure (Ghoshal & Moran, 1996), and thus may take longer 
both to repair and to fade from partners‘ minds. 
Our framework for unpacking the key components of collaboration has several 
practical implications. Cooperation and coordination represent significant challenges to 
alliance managers, particularly because they cannot rely on traditional forms of authority 
to achieve either one. Clarifying the distinctions between cooperation and coordination   64 
problems, their specific root causes, and their remedies should enable alliance managers 
to more effectively diagnose cooperation and coordination problems, and increase their 
awareness that particular interventions may improve cooperation but not coordination and 
vice versa (e.g., Kretschmer & Puranam, 2008). We also hope that the framework will 
alert managers that cooperation and coordination issues should be kept in mind 
throughout all stages of an alliance, and that alliances are unlikely to succeed unless both 
kinds of issues are addressed. During partner selection, they should consider not just 
levels of trust and alignment of incentives with prospective partners, but also the 
compatibility and complementarity of the relationship, in order to minimize coordination 
losses and maximize coordination gains. Similarly, governance should not limit itself to 
ensuring sufficient contractual protections (Parkhe, 1993) but should also incorporate 
understanding of the task requirements, allocation of responsibility, joint responses to 
contingencies, and interaction protocols that are critical to early coordination (Doz, 1996; 
Faems et al., 2008; Mayer & Argyres, 2004). During the actual operation of the alliance, 
managers should monitor not just for emerging conflicts and misalignment of incentives 
but also for weaknesses in coordination and opportunities to promote partners‘ 
compatibility via mutual adaptation, learning, and co-specialized investments. Our 
framework may help guard against  ―coordination neglect‖  (Heath & Staudenmayer, 
2000), which leads managers to attend to cooperation issues at the expense of 
coordination problems.  
Our framework also stresses understanding interconnections between cooperation 
and coordination in alliances. It reminds managers not to neglect the social needs of 
alliance partners, and to build trust and sustain commitment—even in partnerships that   65 
are primarily struggling with coordination issues—because doing so may indirectly 
support coordination by providing for effective and open communication and flexible 
adjustments of alliance structures. Cooperation can beget coordination as partners 
become more willing to make relationship-specific investments. Likewise, coordination 
can breed cooperation via increasing joint satisfaction in the relationship and growing 
knowledge of each other and of the tasks. But cooperation and coordination may also 
hinder each other. The framework prompts practitioners to assess, on the one hand, 
partners‘ contributions and goals, and, on the other, anticipated coordination needs and 
partners‘ estimated coordination skills and capabilities. Further, it encourages 
practitioners to assess whether partners‘ contributions are sufficient or, alternatively, 
whether coordination requirements exceed their abilities such that ambitious goals may 
need to be scaled down.  
Finally, our perspective can sensitize alliance managers to the adverse 
consequences of misattributions of cooperation or coordination failure. Contradictory 
attributions can create significant tensions in a partnership, which can in turn degenerate 
into full-scale vicious cycles of declining perceived cooperation and coordination. 
According to our perspective, alliance partners benefit from recognizing and 
acknowledging each other‘s idiosyncratic concerns: doing so can pave the way for shared 
understandings of cooperation and coordination issues, and for effective corrective 
measures to get a flailing partnership back on track. In short, the analytic benefits that our 
framework provides researchers may apply equally to practitioners.      66 
 TABLES 
  Cooperation Perspective  Coordination Perspective 
Substance of alliance 
agreement 
What contributions are 
made and what outcomes 
are expected by alliance 
partners 
 
How interactions are 
organized by alliance 
partners  
Key motivation  Actively managing resource 
dependencies and sharing 
investment risk  
 
Actively managing task 
interdependencies and 
uncertainties in alliance 
Key concern/risks  Relationship risk: unstable 
commitments and hidden 
motivations 
 
Operational risk: inability to 
coordinate across 
organizational boundaries  
What success looks like  Stability, equity, goal 





joint action  





Remedies to prevent failure  Legal or private sanctions; 
social sanctions; 
identification and relational 
attachment 
Hierarchies, authority, and 
formalization; institutions 
and conventions; inter-
personal linkages and 
liaisons  
 
Table 1. Comparison of the cooperation and coordination perspectives 
   67 
 
  Partner selection…  Alliance design…  Postformation dynamics… 
Cooperation 
perspective 
 …based on prior partnering experience  
Gulati, 1995b 
Li & Rowley, 2002 
Podolny, 1994 
 
 …based on indirect ties between 
organizations 
Chung, Singh, & Lee, 2000 
Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999 
Walker, Kogut, & Shan, 1997  
 
 …based on partner’s centrality and 
status 
Ahuja, 2000 
Ahuja, Polidoro, & Mitchell, 2009 
Guler & Guillen, 2010 
Podolny, 1994 
 
 …based on shared identity with partner 
Ingram & Inman, 1996 
Ingram & McEvily, 2007 
 
 … relies on formal governance 
structures and/or detailed contracts 






 …relies on social mechanisms such 
as prior or indirect ties, reputation, 
and shared nationality to prevent 
exchange hazards and sustain 
commitment  
Banerjee & Duflo, 2000 
Gulati, 1995 
Kalnins & Mayer, 2004 
Robinson & Stuart, 2007 
 
 …prompt renegotiation among 




Khanna, Gulati, & Nohria, 1998 
Reuer & Arino, 2002 
Reuer, Zollo, & Singh, 2002 
 
 …prompt renegotiation among 
partners due to changing 
relational commitments  
Arino & de la Torre, 1998 
Doz, 1996 
Faems et al., 2008 









 …based on prior partnering experience  
 … relies on formal governance 
structures and/or detailed contracts 
to address coordination 
requirements  
Gulati & Singh, 1998 
 …prompt reorganization of 
coordination provisions due to 
partners’ learning and 
adaptation 
Larson, 1992   68 
Li & Rowley, 2002 
 
 …based on compatibility of partner’s 
resources and routines  
Stuart, 1998 
Mitsuhashi & Greve, 2009 
Nachum, 2010 
 
Mellewigt, Madhok, & Weibel, 2007 
Mesquita & Brush, 2008 
 
 … incorporates partners’ 
experiential learning to specify 
more detailed contracts to address 
coordination requirements  
Argyres & Mayer, 2007 
Argyres et al., 2007 
Mayer & Argyres, 2004 
Puranam & Vanneste, 2009 
White, 2005 




Table 2. Cooperation and coordination issues across the alliance life cycle  69 
 
  Relationship between 
cooperation and coordination  
Impact of cooperation and 
coordination on alliance 
performance outcomes 
Independent Model  Cooperation and coordination 
are independent 
 
Simple additive effect 
Interdependent Model  Cooperation and coordination 
are interdependent, 




Interpretive Perspective  Relationship between 
cooperation and coordination 
is subjectively construed; 
possible reductionist bias 
 
Subjective attribution of 
performance outcomes to 
cooperation and coordination  
 
Table 3. Alternative conceptions of the relationship between cooperation, 
coordination, and performance outcomes 
     70 
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